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Abstract
I briefly review several debates between standard cognitivist theories and more embod-
ied (and enactive) theories in the area of social cognition, especially in the context of 
developmental studies and recent false-belief experiments with young infants. I suggest 
that the concept of natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009) fits best with the more 
embodied and enactive accounts of social cognition, and that it provides a good model 
for an embodied learning processes. 
Keywords: Natural Pedagogy – Social Cognition – Interaction – False-belief Tasks – 
Ostensive Communication
Pedagogia naturale e interazione sociale
Rivisito brevemente vari dibattiti che intercorrono tra le teorie cognitive standard e le 
teorie embodied (e enactive) all’interno dell’area della social cognition, specialmente 
nel contesto dei developmental studies e dei recenti false-belief experiments effettuati 
con bambini piccoli. Suggerisco che il concetto di natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 
2009) funziona meglio con una teoria embodied e enactive della cognizione sociale e 
che esso fornisce un buon modello per un processo di apprendimento embodied learning.
Parole chiave: Pedagogia naturale – Cognizione sociale – Interazione – Compito 
della falsa credenza – Comunicazione ostensiva
Introduction
In many, and perhaps most cases, we learn from others. That makes learn-
ing a highly intersubjective phenomenon, and suggests that a good under-
standing of the learning process, and how pedagogical practice should hap-
pen, can benefit from a better understanding of intersubjectivity. Studies of 
intersubjectivity and social cognition have been advanced in recent years in 
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approaches that have integrated phenomenology with developmental psy-
chology and cognitive neuroscience. This integration has occurred around 
the concept of embodied cognition (EC), and can be found in the work 
of phenomenologists who draw from the insights of Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Merleau-Ponty (e.g., Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Gallagher, 
2005; Ratcliffe, 2007). This turn to a phenomenologically-inspired EC, 
however, has been controversial from the perspective of standard cognitive 
science which understands cognition in terms of computational models, 
internal representations, and subpersonal processes that all occur “in the 
head” of the individual cognizer. In contrast, embodied approaches cham-
pion the constitutive role of non-representational, extra-neural bodily and 
environmental (physical, social, and cultural) factors. The cognizer is an 
embodied agent rather than a central processor, and cognition is enacted in 
the movements and actions the agent in-the-world is capable of performing 
(Thompson, 2007; Hutto & Myin, 2013). For some theorists, cognition is 
an extensive event – incorporating tools, technologies, and even institutions 
in the processes that constitute perception, memory, thinking, and problem 
solving (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008; Menary, 2009; Gallagher, 
2013). 
It’s important to note, however, that the now common mantra that cog-
nition is embodied, environmentally embedded, enactive, and extended 
hides a number of important disagreements among EC theorists that con-
cern just these terms. What does embodiment mean, and how essential is 
the body itself (rather than just the brain, or possible prosthetic enhance-
ments or replacements)? Is cognition entirely non-representational (as the 
enactivists claim), or does it depend on some minimal, action-oriented rep-
resentations (as some extended mind theorists tend to claim)? Precisely how 
should we define the role of the environment and what is the nature of the 
coupling between body and environment? All of these issues remain unset-
tled and are the topics of ongoing debates (see, e.g., Kiverstein & Clark, 
2009). Apart from the often fascinating empirical discoveries, part of what 
makes cognitive science an exciting theoretical field is that in almost every 
corner there is ongoing debate among orthodox cognitivists, embodied 
theorists, enactivists, extended minders, etc., and these debates range in an 
interdisciplinary way across disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, 
linguistics, philosophy of mind, AI and robotics, and phenomenology. 
My focus in this paper is on the topic of social cognition, and specifically 
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as it relates to questions of pedagogy. My own view is that research on EC 
should inform theories of social cognition, and that this has practical impli-
cations for pedagogy. In the following sections I defend a phenomenologi-
cally-informed theory of embodied social cognition (although without of-
fering the full account that this topic deserves), and relate it to the concept 
of natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). I also want to emphasize, 
however, that intersubjectivity itself is just as basic as embodiment when it 
comes to explaining cognition and learning. Any attempt to explain cogni-
tion purely in terms of factors (embodied or otherwise) that do not include 
social or intersubjective factors remains philosophically autistic (Gallagher, 
2009). In this respect, the topic of social cognition is not simply a sub-topic 
within the topic of cognition; rather, it holds a central place in any full ac-
count of the mind.
The social cognition debates
In the midst of the debates about EC one finds an ongoing, and equally 
contentious discussion of social cognition and intersubjectivity. EC ap-
proaches to questions about how we understand others come into con-
flict with more standard and cognitivist views of “theory of mind” (ToM), 
which include so-called “theory theory” (TT) and simulation theory (ST). 
TT and ST have their own debates, but these ToM approaches also find 
themselves pitted against more recently developed EC approaches. One 
such, phenomenologically-inspired EC approach is sometimes referred to 
as interaction theory (IT). In brief, the differences between these approaches 
can be summarized as follows.
TT: our understanding of others is based on our ability to mindread, 
that is, to attribute mental states to others by making theoretical inferences 
guided by folk (or common-sense) psychology. That is, by appealing to the 
various rules or platitudes of folk psychology, we can explain and predict 
the other person’s behavior by attributing to her certain beliefs and desires. 
We can think of this as a third-person process since our use of theoretical 
inference is based on a third-person observation of the other.
ST: our understanding of others depends on a form of mindreading 
based, not on folk-psychological inferences, but on our ability to use our 
own mind as a model to simulate the mind of the other. We put ourselves 
“in the shoes” of the other, ask what we would believe or desire in that 
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situation, and then we explain or predict her behavior by projecting such 
mental states to her. Although this process is usually characterized as begin-
ning with a third-person observation of the other’s behavior, we can think 
of simulation as involving a first-person perspective since our understanding 
is based primarily on using our own mental processes as a model. 
IT: our understanding of others, in most of our everyday encounters, is 
based on embodied interactions with them in shared contexts. In our inter-
actions with others we perceive their bodily postures and movements, their 
gestures, facial expressions, vocal intonations, and actions in highly contex-
tualized pragmatic and social situations, and we respond to them in similar 
action-oriented ways. In most of our everyday encounters the information 
we gain from these interactions is sufficient for understanding others, and 
no further processes of mindreading are required. If in some circumstances 
we do need a more sophisticated understanding of their motives or reasons 
for acting as they do, we draw on a rich narrative background rather than 
a theory or a simulation routine. According to IT, we can think of the 
processes involved in intersubjectivity as second-person processes since they 
depend not simply on one individual’s internal mechanisms, but require 
the dynamic interaction of more than one person.
IT draws from phenomenological, developmental, and neuroscientific 
evidence to argue against TT and ST, and to substantiate its own claims. 
TT and ST tend to reject phenomenology as a good guide to the processes 
in question, since, for both TT and ST, most, if not all, of the important 
processing happens sub-personally, in functional theory-of-mind mecha-
nisms (ToMMs) or mirror neurons. Accordingly, whatever “seems” to be 
happening at the conscious or personal level is simply beside the point (e.g., 
Spaulding, 2010; Jacob, 2011). For their part, phenomenologists, without 
denying that the brain is dynamically involved in intersubjective processes, 
defend the idea that intersubjectivity is something that happens at a person-
al (or inter-personal) level, and understanding such personal-level processes 
is required to explain whatever is happening on the subpersonal level (Gal-
lagher, 2013). I won’t try to resolve this aspect of the debate here. Rather, 
I’ll focus on the developmental and neuroscientific evidence. In this respect 
there is some agreement about what the important data actually are; the 
disagreement concerns how to interpret the data. 
For example, there is general agreement that mirror neurons have some-
thing to do with social cognition. Mirror neurons activate under two con-
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ditions: when I, as an agent, perform an intentional action, and when I, as 
an observer, perceive you perform that same action. Almost everyone agrees 
on the neuroscience of mirror neurons. ST has argued that these neurons 
play a central role in the simulation process – mirror neurons in the motor 
system are simulating (Gallese, 2001; Goldman, 2006), and thereby help-
ing us to understand the actions of others and to mindread their intentions. 
TT, while not denying that the mirror system is involved in some low-level 
action understanding, nonetheless contends that the real action takes place 
in other areas of the brain (medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, among oth-
ers) activated for mindreading mental states such as beliefs and desires (e.g., 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). IT, while not denying that the mirror system is 
involved, disputes the idea that mirror neurons are simulating, and instead 
argues that mirror neuron activation is part of or preparatory for an enactive 
(action-oriented) response to the other person’s actions (Gallagher, 2007; 
Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). In addition to debates about how to interpret 
mirror neuron activation there are also debates about the ontogenetic status 
of mirror neurons. Either they are genetically innate, the product of long-
term evolutionary processes (indeed, mirror neurons were first discovered in 
macaque monkeys), or they owe their specific function to processes that in-
volve learned associations (e.g., Catmur, Walsh & Heye, 2007). This aspect 
of the debate suggests that developmental issues are important to consider.
Developmental studies over the past 40 years have made it clear that our 
traditional understanding of infant development has been woefully inad-
equate – and this includes some aspects of the Piagetian tradition, which 
has had a significant impact on the field of educational theory and practice. 
In developmental studies of social cognition there is also general agreement 
on important data, but again there is controversy concerning their interpre-
tation. Looking closely at one of these disagreements will get us closer to 
issues that relate more directly to pedagogy.
The new false belief experiments
Standard false-belief tests point to the ages of 3-4 years as significant since 
on average, at around 4 years, children begin to be able to recognize when 
another person has a false belief about a particular situation. One interpre-
tation is that children around 4 years attain a theory of mind (ToM), which 
allows them to “mindread” the other person’s mental states. TT conceives 
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of the child at this age gaining ability in using folk psychology to make 
inferences about the other person’s mental states. Despite claims made 
by theory theorists about the implicit (or even subpersonal) nature of the 
theoretical inference involved (e.g., Lavelle, 2012; Spaulding, 2010), the 
standard false belief tests that are cited as evidence for such inferential pro-
cesses are completely explicit. The child is asked to observe a situation and 
to make a conscious judgment about where some third person (or usually 
puppet, doll, or cartoon character) will look for a toy that has been moved, 
unbeknownst to that person. Accordingly, such tests involve 3rd person, ob-
servational strategies, and are designed to require a personal-level inference. 
On average, the three-year-old fails the test and the four-year-old passes it. 
What is tested in such experiments (namely, the child’s ability to mindread 
the third person with whom they are not interacting), and the explanations 
of how this happens completely ignore the successful second-person inter-
action that happens between child (including the three-year old child) and 
experimenter. As we’ll see, this is an important point if we are to explain 
why the three-year old fails the test, while younger infants seemingly pass 
false belief tests.
In regard to the latter, recent experiments (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010) purportedly show that 13- and 15-month-
old infants pass more implicit false belief tests. The infant witnesses an 
agent place a toy in location A and then either leave the room or turn away. 
Unbeknownst to the agent, the toy is then shifted to location B. The agent 
then returns to look for the toy. The information the agent has should 
lead her to look in location A, where she falsely believes the toy to be. The 
agent (one of the experimenters), however, looks in location B. The infant 
indicates a violation of expectations (VOE) by looking longer at unexpect-
ed behavior (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Song et al., 2008; Surian et al., 
2007). In this case the infant looks longer at the situation when the agent 
goes to the B location than when the agent goes to the A location. In other 
experiments (e.g., Southgate et al., 2007) infants show anticipated looking 
(AL) at targets where they expect the agent to look for the toy. The experi-
mental results are surprising precisely because the TT consensus had been 
that infants this young (13-15 months) were thought not to have a concept 
of belief, and certainly not to be capable of representing (or engaging in the 
kind of metarepresentational process necessary to grasp) false belief. Despite 
that, theory theorists interpret the results in terms of TT: the infant is able 
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to attribute a false belief to the agent. Carruthers (2009, p. 166), for exam-
ple, sees this performance as “evidence of very early metarepresentational 
competence in infants, embracing false-belief understanding.” Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He (2010) conclude that the infant not only infers that the agent’s 
mental state consists of a false belief, but that the child can reason about 
a complex set of mental states. Simulation theorists, of course, argue that 
the infant uses simulation skills to understand the situation. Herschbach, 
for example, argues that simulation may account for the infant’s ability 
in this regard. Using simulation, the infant uses “information about the 
other’s beliefs gained from pretending to have those beliefs (where ‘pretend-
ing’ is not necessarily a conscious or person-level notion)’ (2007, 15). It’s 
questionable, however, whether one can characterize subpersonal processes 
in terms of pretense, a person-level concept essential to the traditional ac-
count of simulation (Gallagher, 2007). Accordingly, Herschbach (2008) 
changes route and follows Goldman in shifting to a minimal concept of 
simulation defined by the ‘matching hypothesis’. In this regard, however, 
there is some confusion about what ‘matching’ actually means. The Parma 
group who originally discovered mirror neurons understand the match to 
be an intra-cranial one, internal to one individual’s brain (the action func-
tion of the mirror neuron, when I engage in intentional action, is matched 
by the observational function, when I see the action of the other person). 
Matching means “mapping the visual representation of the observed action 
onto the motor representation of the same action” in the observer’s brain 
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001, 661). In contrast, Goldman (2006) characterizes 
the match as happening inter-cranially between brains (my mirror system 
matches your mirror system). “Applied to mindreading, a minimally neces-
sary condition is that the state ascribed to the target is ascribed as a result of 
the attributor’s instantiating, undergoing, or experiencing, that very state. 
In the case of successful simulation, the experienced state matches that of 
the target. This minimal condition for simulation is satisfied [in the neural 
simulation model]” (Goldman & Sripada, 2005, p. 208; also see Jacob, 
2011). Regardless of how one conceives matching, this form of simulation 
looks like a good explanation of imitative responses, but it’s difficult to see 
how it can explain how young infants are able to understand the actions of 
the other agent. 
An alternative, behavioral interpretation is simply that the infant expects 
the agent’s action to be guided by what the agent has done or seen rather 
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than by what the agent has not seen. The infant expects a certain action; 
that expectation is formed by recognizing that the agent sees or does not 
see something. The infant knows, for example, that the agent has not seen 
the toy being moved, anticipates that the agent will look one place, but is 
surprised that the agent looks in a different location. The infant, accord-
ing to Ruffman and Perner (2005; Perner & Ruffman, 2005) follows a set 
of behavioral rules (e.g. ‘people look for objects where they last saw them’) 
gained via statistical learning abilities.1 This account still requires some kind 
of inference on the part of the infant. Moreover, Baillargeon, Scott, & He 
(2010) suggest that the behavioral rules explanation fails because of the 
large number of rules that would be needed in a variety of situations involv-
ing false beliefs. It is not clear, however, why infants should not be able 
to apply more general perception and action principles, specifically along 
enactive lines (i.e., in terms of their own action capabilities), especially if 
infants spend their entire first year interacting with others and begin to 
engage in joint attention and joint actions starting around 9-12 months. 
Note that the TT, ST, and behavioral accounts are methodologically indi-
vidualistic. Both TT and ST require some kind of monological mental or 
brain mechanism to function within the infant. Behavioral interpretations 
require a mechanistic, causal process of abstraction to general rules, and 
then inference from rule to predicted action. Such approaches ignore the 
contribution of, or the potential for, interaction. What is significant, on the 
IT approach, is that, since birth, the infant has been dialogically interacting 
with others in strongly embodied and enactive ways, and in ways that at-
tune them to perception-action principles. On the IT enactive view, infants 
understand others in terms of how they can interact with them, or in terms of 
the infant’s engagement in what the other is doing or expressing or feeling. 
This may apply even in cases where the infant is simply observing rather 
than actually interacting with the agent. The agent’s involvement in the 
world, which the infant sees, can influence her expectations in terms of the 
possible or potential interactions she can have with that person.
Experiments that involve dialogical interaction rather than just observa-
tion offer some insight into this idea. Buttelmann, Carpenter and Toma-
sello (2009) show that 18-month-olds attempt to help an agent retrieve a 
toy while taking into account the fact that the agent hasn’t seen a switch of 
location (the false belief situation). In that situation, when the agent focuses 
on the wrong location (A), the infant is ready to lead him to the correct lo-
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cation (B), but not in the situation when the agent knows about the switch, 
i.e., the true belief situation, and still goes to A. In the latter case the infant 
goes to assist the agent at A. The infant sees exactly the same thing in the 
case of true belief (when the agent knows there has been a shift from A to B) 
as in the case of false belief (when the agent does not know about the shift). 
The fact that the infant sees either that the agent has seen the switch or not, 
plus the agent’s behavior with respect to A (e.g., moving to the container 
at A and attempting to open it), is enough to specify the difference in the 
agent’s intention – an intention that is built into the agent’s movements 
within the situation. The intention signals a difference in affordance, i.e., 
a difference in how the infant can act, and thereby interact with the agent. 
The infant does not have to make inferences to mental states since all of the 
information needed to understand the other and to interact is already avail-
able in what the infant has seen of the situation.2 
The enactive approach to social cognition emphasizes embodied dialogi-
cal interaction (De Jaegher et al., 2010). On this view, the capacity for un-
derstanding social situations complicated by an agent’s lack of information 
is closely intertwined with the infant’s ability to deploy social competences 
that engage with those situations. Even in cases where the infant is allowed 
only to observe, the violation of expectations may be a violation of affor-
dance expectation – the fact that the agent goes to B rather than A does not 
present the expected affordance for the infant’s own potential action. Even 
in the case of observation, the agent’s involvement in the world, which I see, 
can influence my expectations in terms of the possible or potential interac-
tions I can have with that person.
How can we explain why 13-18-month-old infants seemingly pass false 
belief tests while 3-year-old children fail the standard variety of such tests? 
As Pierre Jacob (2013) has pointed out, the tasks are quite different, and the 
difference between explicit requirements (in the standard tests) and implicit 
opportunities (in the young infant tests) puts the infants in a different situ-
ation. To be more precise, on Jacob’s account, differences in the number of 
perspectives involved in the two kinds of tests are important. In the stand-
ard test, the infant is required to deal with two perspectives – the third-
person perspective required to make a judgment about the other person (or 
puppet, etc.) with whom the child is not interacting, and the second-person 
perspective required to interactively engage with the experimenter. In the 
young infant tests, the infant is required only to observe the agent in a 
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third-person perspective (or, alternatively, in some experiments, engage in 
a second-person perspective with the agent). For Jacob it is the number of 
perspectives that makes for the complicating difference – a child dealing 
with only one perspective is less likely to become confused about what is 
required than a child (even at three years) who is required to deal with two 
perspectives at once. The task is complicated. A similar point is made by 
Rubio-Fernández and Geurts (2013). 
Let me offer a slightly different explanation. Rather than the number of 
perspectives, or the complexity of the task, per se, I suggest that in the case 
of the standard test, the second-person interaction (with the experimenter) 
has a saliency that takes precedence over the third-person task and biases 
the child’s answer. Both the child and the experimenter have a common 
knowledge of where the toy really is, and in their real interaction with each 
other, this shared knowledge becomes the salient feature and motivates the 
(wrong) answer to the third-person task. In the standard experiment, the 
three-year-old more consistently provides the answer that is facilitated by 
the second-person interaction with the experimenter. If one rearranges the 
task in a way that makes the interaction with the experimenter support 
(rather than distract from) the child’s ability to track the perspective of the 
agent (see Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013), the child does much better.
Natural pedagogy
It may be clear by now that I prefer IT to TT or ST as a way to explain 
social cognition, in young infants, as well as in adults. I haven’t provided 
all of the evidence here; rather, I’ve focused on some ongoing debates. The 
full story would involve a detailed developmental account in terms of pri-
mary and secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen and 
Aitken, 2001; Reddy, 2008). Primary intersubjectivity focuses on just those 
sensory-motor, embodied capacities, operative from birth or very early in 
the first year, that allow the infant to track and interact with others in terms 
of their movements, postures, facial expressions, gestures, actions, etc. Sec-
ondary intersubjectivity, which begins sometime during the first year of 
life, involves joint attention in richly contextualized pragmatic and social 
situations. These are not precursors to real social cognition; they constitute 
a kind of social cognition from the very beginning, and continue to char-
acterize our adult interactions with others. To this we can add narrative 
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competency and the rich hermeneutical background that narrative practices 
provide (Gallagher & Hutto, 2008). Even if we say that in most of our 
everyday encounters, interactive and narrative practices, rather than mind-
reading, account for our understanding of others, we can also be pluralists 
about social cognition and say that in some specific (and perhaps unusual) 
circumstances we may need to employ theoretical inference or simulation 
routines to make sense out of someone’s behavior. 
I now want to suggest the importance of embodied interaction (primary 
and secondary intersubjective practices) for learning processes. Specifically, 
I want to suggest that the notion of natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 
2009) fits closely with the IT approach to social cognition, and provides 
a way to explain how we can move from very basic, non-representational, 
non-conceptual EC, to an account of how we gain generalizable, conceptual 
knowledge. One might think that for the latter one clearly needs language, 
as some philosophers argue (Brandom, 1994, Davidson, 1975, Dummett, 
1993). Davidson, for example, argues that a child does not have a concept 
of belief (or any concept) until she is capable of speech or the interpretation 
of speech (1975, 170). So whatever the 13-month-old infant is doing, she is 
not detecting false beliefs. Piaget, in contrast, argues that concepts may be 
acquired prior to language ability (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), and a number 
of philosophers agree, conceptualizing concepts in terms of representations 
(Bermudez, 2003; Fodor, 1975; Pinker, 1994). I want to argue that it is 
neither language nor mental representations that initiates conceptual abili-
ties (i.e., abilities to acquire and use concepts), even if at some point lan-
guage and external representations may facilitate concept acquisition and 
use, but rather something very specific in intersubjective interaction. To see 
this, consider the following experiment, again involving the so-called “false-
belief” task, in a circumstance that involves language. 
Southgate, Chevallier and Csibra (2010) conducted an experiment with 
18-month-olds. An agent hides two toys in separate boxes, and then leaves. 
Infants then watch as another person switches the contents of the two box-
es. When the agent returns she (the agent) points to one of the boxes (A), 
announcing that the toy hidden inside is a ‘sefo’. When the infants are then 
asked to retrieve the ‘sefo’ most of them approach the other box (B), indi-
cating that they must have understood that the agent intended to name the 
toy that was now in B, unaware of the toy’s changed location. The infant 
sees the agent’s original action and sees the switch that the agent does not 
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see. This is another experiment that allows the child to interact. There is in-
teraction when the agent communicates with the child in this situation and 
when the infant is invited to act. IT argues that the infant does not have to 
engage in mindreading since all of the information relevant for the infant’s 
response is available in the behavioral situation, and is sufficient to inform 
the infant’s action.
The child learns something in this experiment. She learns that the toy 
is called a ‘sefo’. Seemingly she learns this from hearing the word ‘sefo’ 
used to indicate the toy presumably in a certain location. Does having this 
word allow the child to generalize – that is to grasp a concept under which 
she would be able to categorize other things? If, for example, someone else 
walked into the room carrying the same kind of toy, would the child think 
that this too was a sefo? Csibra and Gergely’s (2009) notion of natural 
pedagogy addresses this question and suggests that it is not the word, or lan-
guage, per se (or language alone) that allows for this conceptual ability. In 
the remainder of this section I summarize their theory of natural pedagogy, 
highlighting its relevance to embodied, intersubjective learning.
For Csibra and Gergely (2009, p. 148), “Learning involves acquiring 
new information and using it later when necessary.” In other words learn-
ing is a conceptual accomplishment. It requires generalizing information to 
new situations – learning not just individual facts that apply only to the one 
immediate situation in which they are learned, but learning to apply learned 
concepts to different objects, locations, or contexts. How is it possible to do 
this when in the learning process we are actually located in only one par-
ticular situation – how do we know that the information we gain about X 
in this situation applies to X in other situations (the problem of induction)? 
One explanation is children learn by association. They hear the word ‘sefo’ 
a number of times, always in association with the particular toy X. After a 
number of instances they learn to associate the word with the thing. Some 
kind of statistical learning mechanism in their brain establishes the associa-
tion (firing together – wiring together). Passive observations are sufficient 
on this theory. Infants, however, tend to learn faster than can be accounted 
for in this way. In some cases, they can learn generalizable knowledge from 
a single instance. How does that work?
Csibra and Gergely (2009) argue that certain interactive aspects of com-
municative practices are the key. Infants are not simply passively assimi-
lating and processing knowledge; they are more proactively receptive to 
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communications because they are sensitive to ostensive signals that indicate 
they are being addressed. In contexts of ostensive communicative interac-
tion infants develop referential expectations and are biased to interpret such 
communications as conveying information that is generalizable.
They provide some examples. If I show the infant two airplanes and say 
that ‘airplanes fly’, the infant learns not just that these two airplanes fly, 
they learn generic knowledge about airplanes: the information “is gener-
alizable to other members of the category and to variable contexts” (Ibid). 
Importantly, the communication of knowledge in this way is not limited to 
linguistic communication. 
If I show you by manual demonstration how to open a milk carton, what you will 
learn is how to open that kind of container (i.e. you acquire kind-generalizable 
knowledge from a single manifestation). In such cases, the observer does not need 
to rely on statistical procedures to extract the relevant information to be generalized 
because this is selectively manifested to her by the communicative demonstration. 
(2009, p. 148).
It is essential that the communication be interactive, in the sense that it 
is ostensively directed at the learner, or that the learner is being actively 
guided. The pattern of learning is fundamentally different between situa-
tions where the learner is passively observing or overhearing (call this the 
osmosis method), and situations where the learner is ostensively directed or 
guided. Ostensive communication means that (1) there is some indication 
or sign that the communication or demonstration is meant to be commu-
nicative (and not just an accidental happening), and (2) there is some sign 
that specifies the addressee so that the infant knows she is being addressed. 
In this regard, as Csibra and Gergely show, the most ostensive cues involve 
direct gaze towards the addressee, and mutual eye contact. Infants have an 
innate tendency to look to the eyes and to join in mutual gaze. Auditory 
cues (e.g., motherese intonation) also can capture the infant’s attention.
The attention of the infant must be directed to the referent, the thing 
about which the infant is learning. Besides linguistic aspects of reference, 
one can use eye direction (“young infants tend to follow gaze shifts only 
when these are preceded by an ostensive signal such as eye contact or infant-
directed greeting” [2009, p. 151], and infants expect to find a referent when 
they follow gaze), pointing, or manipulation/demonstration. 
Perhaps most importantly, “children expect to learn something gener-
Shaun Gallagher
140
alizable in ostensive-referential contexts rather than just become informed 
about particular episodic facts that obtain only in the ‘here-and-now’” 
(2009, p. 151). This differs from the osmosis method where the learning 
usually does not generalize. For example, when an agent looks at a particu-
lar object and expresses a certain emotion on his face (joy, disgust, fear etc.), 
14-month-olds interpret this “as conveying valence information about the 
referent [rather] than expressing the subjective attitude state of the commu-
nicator towards the object” and 18-month-olds apply this to other people, 
i.e., they generalize to the idea that other people will also like or dislike or 
fear the object, respectively (Gergely et al., 2007). But this happens only 
when this is communicated to them in an ostensive manner (in contrast to 
the osmosis method) (Egyed et al., 2007). 
Csibra and Gergely (2009) also cite evidence of another difference be-
tween osmosis and ostensive situations. In the latter situation, but not the for-
mer one, the 9-month-old focuses and learns about the permanent features of 
an object (e.g., its visible features), which can be referenced and re-identified 
later in different situations. She ignores information about current location 
of a moveable object, information that is irrelevant for its future recognition 
or the identification of other members of its kind. In the non-communicative 
osmosis situation, in contrast, the infant is more likely to detect changes in an 
object’s location than its appearance (Yoon et al., 2008).3,4 
Conclusion
There are some important lessons to be learned from these developmental 
studies of natural pedagogy and the wider debates about social cognition. 
These studies demonstrate that natural pedagogy depends on embodied in-
tersubjective interactions – processes that are best described as occurring in 
the world (oriented towards action in highly contextualized pragmatic and 
social environments) rather than in any individual’s head. Getting another 
person’s attention is not a matter of directing her mental state – it’s a mat-
ter of putting to use the various embodied processes that fall under the 
headings of primary and secondary intersubjectivity, in dynamic situations 
where things are not only named, but demonstrated in an ostensive com-
municative manner. This kind of communication is a kind of interaction 
where the learner is not simply an observer. 
On this basis, I want to suggest one prescriptive generalization: natural 
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pedagogy ought to be considered an important factor in most learning situ-
ations, and not just in the contexts of working with infants. In contrast to 
an osmosis method, ostensive, interactive engagement with the student(s) 
should be the rule. Perhaps we have known this since the time of Come-
nius; we now certainly have good science to support it. Yet it is a lesson that 
is easily lost in the overabundance of educational methodologies.
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Notes
1  This view is similar to the behavioral abstraction hypothesis (e.g., Povinelli and 
Vonk, 2003), which states that infants are able to represent observed behavior in terms of 
a more abstract interpretation.
2  Similar considerations apply to the interactive study by Southgate, Chevallier and 
Csibra, 2010.
3  Csibra and Gergely (2009) suggest that this may explain the results of the classic A-
not-B test, where infants who are engaged ostensively when they are shown an object, lose 
track of the object, looking for it in position A where they were first shown it, rather than in 
position B, where they have just recently seen it hidden. We can extend this suggestion to the 
contrasting instance of infants who are passive observers in the early false-belief tasks, who 
easily keep track of the toy, and do so even in the ‘sefo’ task where interactive communication 
occurs only after they learn about the toy’s location via passive observation. I suggest this may 
also be relevant to why 3-year-olds tend to fail the standard false-belief tasks. In the standard 
tasks, as noted above, they are engaged by the experimenter in an ostensive second-person 
interaction which biases their attention to what the experimenter references (which is specifi-
cally the new location of the toy). They have no problem following the changing location 
of the toy, registering the original position passively since the observed agent (puppet, doll, 
etc.) is not offering any ostensive cues, and then registering the new position because that 
(changed location) is what the experimenter ostensively references. Is it possible that the child 
then generalizes this knowledge about the new location to others (including the returning 
agent), and therefore answers the key question (“Where will the agent look?”) incorrectly? 
The interesting question becomes: why does the 4-year-old, on average, give the correct an-
swer? In this regard a developing narrative competency may play an important role. 
4  Returning briefly to Davidson’s view that concepts depend on language, he offers 
a perspective that, nonetheless, in light of this analysis of natural pedagogy seems incom-
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plete: “Ostensive learning depends on triangulation, and ostensive learning is crucial to 
the existence of objective thought and language; this is the line of thinking that persuades 
me that triangulation is a necessary condition of thought and language” (Davidson 2003, 
694). One need only think that the notion of triangulation can be pushed back to pre-
linguistic joint attention and joint action to get a more balanced perspective on what is 
possible in the embodied learning and behavior of infants, and from that a more basic 
account of the mind. 
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